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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Tyler Shawn Clapp appeals from the summary denial of his petition for 
post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Clapp filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging the revocation of 
his probation and execution of his sentence for felony DUI. (R., pp. 4-17.) The 
district court summarily dismissed the petition. (R., pp. 158-75.) Clapp filed a 
motion for relief from the judgment under I.R.C.P. 60(b). (R., pp. 186-90.) The 
court granted the motion and set aside the judgment and allowed Clapp to file an 
amended petition. (R., pp. 196-98.) Clapp filed an amended petition. (R., pp. 
177-83.) Included in the amended petition, relevant to this appeal, were claims 
that trial counsel "did not provide effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed 
by the Sixth Amendment" by not obtaining "mental health treatment records from 
Nampa Medical, and an updated mental health evaluation" (R., pp. 178-79) and 
that appellate counsel rendered deficient performance by not "challeng[ing] 
evidence" that petitioner was "driving a lot," which "Petitioner deemed unreliable" 
(R., p. 182). 
The State answered and moved for summary disposition. (R., pp. 219-21, 
224-35.) Clapp responded to the motion. (R., pp. 268-72.) The district court 
granted the motion and dismissed the petition. (R., pp. 274-88.) Clapp timely 
appealed. (R., p. 290.) 
1 
ISSUES 
Clapp states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in dismissing the portion of Mr. 
Clapp's first cause of action, i.e., that counsel was ineffective 
for not providing mental health records to the court, on a 
basis which was not raised in the state's motion for summary 
disposition without giving Mr. Clapp twenty-days notice of its 
intent to dismiss on that basis? 
2. Did the district court also err by dismissing Mr. Clapp's fifth 
cause of action on an alternative basis which was not raised 
in the state's motion for summary disposition without giving 
Mr. Clapp twenty-days notice of its intent to dismiss on that 
basis? 
3. Did the district court err in dismissing Mr. Clapp's fifth cause 
of action because the allegation that Mr. Clapp had been 
driving was not supported by sufficiently reliable evidence 
and thus should have been challenged on appeal? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Clapp failed to show that he was not put on notice that his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present medical records at 
the probation disposition hearing was subject to dismissal because it was 
unsupported by evidence and disproven by the record? 
2. Has Clapp failed to show error in the dismissal of his claim that appellate 
counsel was ineffective for failing to argue the district court violated his 
due process rights by considering hearsay information indicating he had 




Clapp Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Claim Of 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel For Not Submitting His Medical Records At 
The Disposition Hearing 
A. Introduction 
Clapp asserts that the district court granted dismissal on grounds other 
than articulated in the motion for summary disposition, thus depriving him of his 
statutory notice. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-10.) Application of the relevant law to 
the record shows that the district court did not grant summary disposition on a 
ground unrequested by the state. Moreover, because dismissal was proper 
under the theories articulated by the state this Court may affirm on those theories 
on free review. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists which, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require relief to be granted. 
Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). The 
court freely reviews the district court's application of the law. ~ at 434, 835 P.2d 
at 669. The court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory 
allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions 
of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001). 
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C. The District Court Granted Summary Disposition On The Same Grounds 
As Raised By The State's Motion 
Where a summary dismissal is based in whole or in part on grounds 
asserted by the state in its motion, a post-conviction petitioner is not entitled to 
claim that he lacked notice for the first time on appeal. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 
517, 523, 236 P.3d 1277, 1283 (2010). He may, however, make such a claim if 
the grounds for dismissal are other than those offered by the state in support of 
its motion. !sl; Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. 
App. 1986) ("When the court dismisses a case upon the state's motion for 
dismissal, it must still provide twenty-days notice [as required by I.C. § 19-
4906(b)] if the dismissal is based on grounds different from those presented in 
the motion for dismissal."). See also Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 
P.3d 798, 803 (2007); Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322, 900 P.2d 
795, 798 (1995). Grounds for dismissal in a motion and in an order are different 
only if they are "different in kind," meaning they lack "substantial" overlap. Buss 
v. State, 147 Idaho 514, 517-18, 211 P.3d 123, 126-27 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing 
Workman, 144 Idaho at 524, 164 P.3d at 804). Review of the record shows that 
the dismissal by the district court was not on different grounds than requested by 
the state. 
The state moved to dismiss because the "ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding both deficient 
performance and resulting prejudice." (R., p. 224.) In its brief in support of the 
motion the state asserted Clapp's "post-conviction allegations are bare and 
conclusory, are unsupported by admissible evidence, and fail to raise a genuine 
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issue of material fact." (R., p. 230.) Furthermore, the State argued the specific 
allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present medical 
records was "disproven by the trial record," which the State supplied in support of 
its motion. (R., pp. 230, 237-67.) 
Clapp contended that the state's argument was "not correct" because 
medical records had been supplied to the court. (R., pp. 268-69. 1) He claimed 
that the evidence he submitted demonstrated that the information before the 
court in the probation violation disposition hearing "was outdated, erroneous, and 
did not contain accurate information as to whether or not the petitioner could be 
managed with medication." (R., p. 269.) 
The district court concluded there was no material issue of fact, and the 
State was entitled to summary dismissal of this claim. (R., pp. 274-86.) As part 
of this analysis the court specifically reviewed the record of the probation 
proceedings as submitted by and relied on by the state. (R., p. 279.) The district 
court concluded that the record disproved Clapp's allegations of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. (R., pp. 279-80.) 
The record demonstrates that the state requested dismissal for lack of 
sufficient supporting evidence and because the claim was disproven by the 
underlying record. The district court granted the motion, dismissing the claim 
because it was disproved by the underlying record. Any differences in the district 
court's articulation of why the underlying criminal record disproved the claim did 
1 The record contains no medical records supplied with the amended petition or 
the response to the motion for summary dismissal. Counsel is apparently 
referring to records supplied with the original petition. (R., pp. 38-43.) 
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not make the grounds for dismissal "different in kind" and did not deprive Clapp 
of notice that whether the record disproved his claim was at issue. A remand in 
this case would accomplish nothing because there is no reason to believe that 
Clapp withheld evidence believing he did not need to submit it in response to the 
State's motion. Clapp is not entitled to reversal on the theory that he did not 
have adequate opportunity to respond to the state's motion. 
D. The Evidence Clapp Submitted Does Not Support A Prima Facie Claim 
Even if the grounds for the district court's order of summarily dismissal 
were entirely different from those claimed in the State's motion, the order of 
summary dismissal may still be affirmed on the grounds asserted in the State's 
motion if no material issue of fact on those grounds is contained in the record. 
Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676, 227 P.3d 925, 930 (2010); Baxter v. State, 
149 Idaho 859, 243 P.3d 675 (Ct. App. 2010). Application of the correct legal 
standards to the evidence presented by Clapp shows that the State's motion for 
summary dismissal was well taken because the evidence does not support 
Clapp's claim. 
The "right to be represented by appointed counsel" at probation revocation 
hearings is "a due process right." Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 783 (1973). 
Because the right is not "the right of an accused to counsel in a criminal 
prosecution" but instead "the more limited due process right of one who is a 
probationer or parolee only because he has been convicted of a crime," the 
decision of whether counsel should be appointed is "made on a case-by-case 
basis in the exercise of sound discretion." Id. at 789-90. A probationer accused 
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of a probation violation is entitled to appointed counsel only if he makes "a timely 
and colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the alleged violation of the 
conditions upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter 
of public record or uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or 
mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons 
are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present." kt at 790.2 
Clapp made no prima facie showing that the medical records "justified or 
mitigated the violation" to the point that revocation was "inappropriate." Even if 
he had a due process right to counsel the evidence does not raise a viable claim 
that his counsel was ineffective for not presenting medical records to the court at 
the disposition hearing.3 The records in question show a single office visit on 
May 6, 2011 to "est[ablish] care" for "depression." (R., p. 38.) As a result of the 
office visit Clapp was prescribed Fluoxetine for his depression. (R., p. 42.) The 
probation violations arising from drinking in violation of the conditions of 
probation occurred over the course of several days about three months after the 
2 This Court, citing Gagnon, has stated that this right to counsel on a case-by-
case basis is a Sixth Amendment right. State v. Young, 122 Idaho 278, 282, 833 
P.2d 911, 915 (1992). This statement is dicta because the issue in Young was 
decided on statutory grounds. The statement is also wrong, because Gagnon 
was clearly decided on due process grounds, and not the Sixth Amendment. 
Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 789-90. 
3 Because the right to counsel arises out of due process and not the Sixth 
Amendment, there is no reason to believe the Sixth Amendment guarantees of 
effective assistance of counsel apply in this case. Thus, even if due process 
required appointment of counsel, Clapp has cited no legal authority for the 
proposition that such counsel must meet standards of effectiveness. To meet the 
Sixth Amendment standards of ineffective assistance of counsel Clapp would 
have to prove deficient performance and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
7 
office visit. (R., p. 255.) The medical records ultimately undercut Clapp's claims 
at the disposition hearing that the Fluoxetine prescription had "mostly solved my 
self-medicating with alcohol" (R., p. 265 (Tr., p. 13, Ls. 13-18)) by showing that 
Clapp was drinking heavily (and violating his probation) after being given the 
prescription. The evidence presented by Clapp simply does not rise to the level 
of showing a due process right to counsel, much less that any constitutional right 
was infringed by counsel's conduct. The district court may be affirmed on this 
basis to the extent it is different from the actual grounds articulated by the district 
court below. 
11. 
Clapp Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Claim Of 
Ineffective Assistance Of Appellate Counsel 
One of the probation violations alleged in the criminal proceedings was 
that Clapp had violated the law. (R., p. 254.) This allegation was based on the 
probation officer's report that Clapp had admitted driving his father's truck "a lot" 
without a valid license. (Id.) At the probation violation disposition hearing the 
district court expressed concern that Clapp had been driving in the same general 
timeframe he was also drinking. (R., p. 265 (Tr., p. 15, L. 21 - p. 16, L. 6).) 
In this post-conviction case Clapp asserted a claim of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel for failing to claim that the district court's reliance 
on the probation officer's report at the probation disposition hearing violated due 
process. (R., p. 205.) The state moved for summary dismissal on the basis that 
"the petition fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact" "in light of the 
pleadings, answers, admissions and the record of the underlying criminal case." 
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(R., p. 224.) The State argued the claims were "controverted [sic] by the record" 
and "fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact." (R., p. 230.) In regard to the 
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel the State argued that this 
claim was "bare and conclusory without any demonstration of prejudice," not 
supported by any evidence, and contrary to law, and therefore "fails to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding either deficient performance or resulting 
prejudice." (R., pp. 233-34.) 
Clapp responded to the State's argument as follows: 
With regard to his appellate counsel, petitioner told his 
appellate counsel he wanted to challenge his conviction and 
sentence on due process grounds, but was advised by counsel that 
he [counsel] did not know too much about the "due process" 
grounds for relief. Nothing was done. 
(R., p. 271.) 
The district court granted the state's motion, concluding there was no 
evidence of prejudice because the State had preserved the right to argue the 
dismissed probation violation allegations in disposition and the statement of the 
probation officer that Clapp admitted driving was credible and substantial 
evidence. (R., pp. 284-85.) The district court additionally concluded that the 
same disposition (execution of the sentence) was appropriate even without the 
finding of driving. (R., p. 285.) Finally, the district court concluded that the due 
process issue was "nonviable" on appeal, and therefore there was no deficient 
performance. (Id.) 
On appeal Clapp claims the district court erred by granting the State's 
motion on grounds unasserted by the State and by concluding he was not 
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entitled to a hearing on this claim. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-16.) Applying the 
standards articulated above, Clapp has failed to show error. 
First, the claim Clapp lacked notice of the grounds for dismissing his claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel is frivolous. The State argued and the district 
court concluded that the due process challenge was without merit and therefore 
there was neither deficient performance nor prejudice. (R., pp. 233-34, 284.) 
The differences Clapp claims to see in the grounds for the motion and the 
grounds for the order are entirely figments of imagination. The state argued, and 
the district court agreed, that the due process argument would not have prevailed 
on appeal and therefore there was neither deficient performance nor prejudice. 
Second, dismissal on the merits was proper. Clapp claims that, had 
appellate counsel asserted that consideration of the probation officer's statement 
violated due process, he would have prevailed on appeal. This argument fails for 
two reasons. First, Clapp has failed to show any Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel on appeal from probation violation proceedings. The due process right 
to counsel is "limited to the first appeal as of right." Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 
393-94 (1985); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974). Clapp has cited no case 
indicating he had a constitutional right to counsel to appeal from the probation 
revocation proceedings. He has therefore failed to show error in the dismissal of 
his claim of a Sixth Amendment violation in how his counsel handled his appeal 
from revocation of his probation. 
Second, even if Clapp had a right to the effective assistance of counsel he 
failed to present a viable claim that right was violated. Appellate counsel's 
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performance was not deficient and Clapp was not prejudiced because the due 
process violation claim is meritless. 
Because no objection was asserted in the probation violation proceedings, 
appellate counsel would have had to show constitutional error, that the error was 
clear, and prejudice. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P .3d 961, 978 
(2010) (setting forth the three-prong fundamental error standard). Review of the 
record shows no error, much less fundamental error. 
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause "does not apply to 
probationers." State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 766, 171 P.3d 253, 257 (2007). 
"Likewise, the Idaho Rules of Evidence, including the rule against hearsay, do 
not apply to probation revocation proceedings." kl (citations omitted). The 
probation officer's statement about Clapp's admission to driving was properly 
considered by the district court at the revocation proceedings. See State v. 
Martinez, 154 Idaho 940, 946-47, 303 P.3d 627, 633-34 (Ct. App. 2013) (not 
error to consider statement by co-defendant incriminating defendant at 
sentencing hearing). Had appellate counsel attempted to raise the due process 
claim he would have failed to show constitutional error, much less that such error 
was clear on the record. 
Likewise, the district court's finding of no prejudice was correct. Clapp 
failed to demonstrate, or even articulate, why he would have been placed back 
on probation but for consideration of his admission of driving. Lack of prejudice 
shows he could not have prevailed on a claim of fundamental error. Because 
there was no error, no clear error, and no prejudice, the due process claim would 
11 
have failed if raised on appeal. Because the claim would have failed on appeal it 
was neither deficient performance nor prejudicial for appellate counsel to not 
pursue it. 
On this appeal Clapp argues that the probation officer's statement that 
Clapp admitted driving was rendered unreliable, and therefore beyond the scope 
of consideration, because his trial attorney stated (at a different hearing) that 
Clapp denied driving and that Clapp's father would assert he did not loan Clapp 
the car in question. (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-16.) Clapp confuses "contested" 
with "unreliable." He cites no legal reason that merely contesting evidence 
makes it unreliable, especially where, as here, hearsay evidence was contested 
by contrary hearsay evidence. Were Clapp's legal reasoning sound, a full 
evidentiary hearing would be required in sentencing or probation revocation 
proceedings whenever a defendant disputed any fact in any report or pre-
sentence investigation. Clapp has failed to articulate, below or on appeal, why 
the probation officer's statement that Clapp had admitted driving was so 
unreliable that a court could not, in its discretion, rely on that evidence. 
At no point has Clapp articulated a non-frivolous challenge to the district 
court's reliance on the probation officer's report at the probation violation 
disposition hearing. Because there is no basis to believe Clapp would have 
prevailed on an appellate claim that such was fundamental error, he has failed to 
establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the summary dismissal 
of Clapp's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 5th day of January, 
KENNETH K. JORGE 
Deputy Attorney General 
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